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INTRODUCTION
In the last three decades, educational institutions have witnessed ex-
traordinary transformations brought about by litigation and judicial
intervention in the name of educational equity. At the primary and sec-
ondary levels, these transformations have come primarily from
desegregation and school finance equalization litigation,' while at the
postsecondary level they have come from litigation surrounding affirma-
tive action. Although these areas of law have almost entirely remapped the
educational terrain, and the problems with which they concern them-
selves are nearly identical, they are rarely treated by scholars or
* B-A.Yale College; M.Phil. University of Cambridge, Faculty of Education; J.D.
expected 2006,Yale Law School. Many thanks to Stephen Yandle, Brian Lizotte, Jennifer
Booher-Jennings, Jamie Ginott, and Bill Koski for their helpful comments on this paper
and to Adam Kirschner for patient and indispensable editorial advice. My deepest grati-
tude is reserved for Nishka Chandrasoma, Steve Clowney, and Dan Korobkin.
1 See Caroline M. Hoxby, Are Efficiency and Equity in School Finance Substitutes or
Complements?, 10 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVES 51, 51 (1996) ("[Slince desegregation, the most
important changes to American elementary and secondary schooling have almost certainly
been in the realm of school finance.").
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policymakers as being connected or interdependent.2 Perhaps, as one
higher education authority recommends, it is time for a more "honest
conversation" about the relationship between secondary and higher edu-
cation?
A pair of lawsuits filed in California in 1999 force those concerned
about educational equity and diversity in higher education to consider the
legal and policy relationships between school finance reform in secondary
education and affirmative action in higher education. The two lawsuits,
Castaneda v. Regents of the University of California' and Daniel v. California,'
challenged the use of Advanced Placement courses as a criterion for uni-
2. I have not encountered any academic or popular writing tackling the relation-
ship between school finance reform and affirmative action.The consensus among scholars
and advocates is that, despite a shared commitment to educational equity, school finance
reformers and proponents of affirmative action have divergent tactics, are engaged at dif-
ferent levels of the federalist legal structure, and are forced to grapple with the differing
place of school finance and affirmative action in the nation's political economy and social
discourse. Michael Selmi describes the situation as follows:
[S]chools generally prefer to administer a bit of affirmative action rather than
to subject their admissions procedures to scrutiny. Indeed, for years, the state
of Texas exhibited a strong preference for affirmative action programs rather
than revising the gross inequities that had long plagued its system of public
school financing. One can only ask: what would the educational results be
today if Texas had equalized its school funding in the early 1970s? And why
has the debate over affirmative action been so much louder than the debate
over school finance, which remains a stubborn, complex, and peculiarly local
issue?
Michael Selmi, The Life ofBakke:An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 GEO. L.J. 981, 1017
(1999).
3. Former University of California at Berkeley Director of Admissions Bob Laird
has said that higher education policymakers fail to engage in "honest conversation" about
the relationship between primary, secondary, and higher education. Rather, they "respondl
to political pressures in the most expedient way possible, which includes a kind of happy
talk about the future. We're not acknowledging how complex and deep-rooted the prob-
lems [of diversity in higher education] are." Kenneth R.Weiss, An Exploration of Ideas, Issues
and Trends in Education: Q &A with Bob Laird, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999, at B2. More gener-
ally, education law scholars' failure to think across the education system mirrors the
education community's failure to integrate primary, secondary, and higher education into
one system both in theory and in practice. As Andrea Venezia, Michael W Kirst, and An-
thony L. Antonio note, "[S]tates have created unnecessary and detrimental barriers
between high school and college." ANDREA VENEZIA, MtCHAEL W. KIRST, & ANTHONY L.
ANTONIO, BETRAYING iHE COLLEGE DREAM 2 (2003). The system need not function this
way, however: "This is an American phenomenon: there is a much greater disjuncture
between secondary and postsecondary education here than in most other nations." Id. at
14. For the most thorough discussion to date of the yawning gap between secondary and
higher education, see FROM HIGH SCHOOL To COLLEGE: IMPROVING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
SuccEss IN POSTSECONDARv EDUCATION (Michael W Kirst & Andrea Venezia eds., 2004).
4. No. C99-0525 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 2, 1999).
5. No. B C214156 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed July 27, 1999).
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versity admissions and the unequal distribution of Advanced Placement
courses in California public high schools, respectively. These cases repre-
sent the intersection of two movements in the law of education that have
heretofore existed as distinct and separate strategies for improving and
integrating public education. Born in large part of the need for novel ap-
proaches to guaranteeing students of color access to higher education
after Proposition 209 made affirmative action programs illegal in Califor-
nia, they represent a "third way" rejoinder to the traditional policy and
legal framework for expanding access to postsecondary education.' A
more concerted effort to combine the strategies and substantive claims of
the school finance reform and affirmative action movements should result
in expanded access to higher education, particularly for economically dis-
advantaged students and students from historically underrepresented
minority groups.
This Note argues that by combining the normative suasion of edu-
cational finance litigation with the political imperatives manifested in
affirmative action law and practice, those who seek to improve the quality
of secondary education and expand access to higher education would
likely effect greater change than they would working independently. Un-
der the appropriate political and legal circumstances, access to public
higher education ought to be treated as something akin to a fundamental
right, the unequal distribution of which constitutes a violation of equal
protection for students of color and for economically disadvantaged stu-
dents. Using the Castaneda and Daniel lawsuits to probe the rigid contours
of school "finance" reform litigation and the overly formal conceptions of
race-based preferences that pervade discourse about affirmative action, I
argue that these cases provide promising examples of the ways in which
advocates for diversity in higher education may capitalize on the political
will of the people and the structure of the state system of public education
6. The movement for expanded access to higher education for students of color
has traditionally and sequentially taken two forms. The first movement was directed to-
wards traditional affirmative action programs in postsecondary education admissions,
exemplified by what was litigated in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The second movement came in the
wake of assaults on traditional affirmative action. It comprised the evolution of "percent-
age plans," which guaranteed in-state college admissions to students who graduated in a
specified top percentage of their high school class. For a discussion and critique of these
programs, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative
Action, 88 Gao. L.J. 2331 (2000). The "third way" I describe here bucks the trend of a sin-
gular focus on higher education outputs-that is, admissions rates of students of color-
and shifts the focus to the inputs-the secondary preparation of college applicants and the
alignment of that preparation with admissions criteria. Such a shift has been called for by
radical critics of affirmative action like Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier. See Susan Sturm &
Lani Guinier, The Future ofAffirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv.
953, 956 (1996) (arguing that the affirmative action debate has been truncated by narrow
thinking and calling for "a more fundamental critique of existing selection and admission
conventions").
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to advance an agenda that simultaneously improves secondary education
while diversifying institutions of higher education. Although this Note
concentrates on two cases from California, it fundamentally concerns
what advocacy for educational equity will look like throughout the coun-
try for the next generation of students of color and of economically
disadvantaged students. These cases, though born of the particularities of
California's state education system, do not embrace strategies unique to
California. Rather they are harbingers of a promising nationwide trend.
This Note contains three parts. Part I outlines the structure of
California's secondary and postsecondary education systems, highlighting
features and policies crucial to the arguments advanced in this Note. It also
outlines the status of California's education finance and affirmative action
systems in 1999, when Castaneda and Daniel were filed. Part II discusses the
Castaneda and Daniel litigations. Part III places the two lawsuits in a broad
analytical and theoretical framework, drawing on analyses of the school
finance reform and affirmative action movements. I argue that Castaneda
and Daniel potentially portend a new generation of education-based civil
rights litigation that will fuse the normative claims of school finance re-
form with the political imperatives of affirmative action.7 Finally, I
compare these two lawsuits to similar litigation in Connecticut and New
York to convey that the Castaneda and Daniel strategies are readily trans-
latable across state boundaries and should be regarded as models of
political acumen and not as irreplicable phenomena.
7. When I refer to the political imperatives of affirmative action, I mean to suggest
that the contemporary racial and political economy of the United States engenders de-
mands for strategies aimed at diversifying higher education and other institutions at the
core of the nation's power structure. These imperatives are evident, for example, in the
amicus briefs filed by the nation's military, industrial, and higher education leaders on
behalf of the respondents in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003). In those briefs, leaders from the various sectors of society contended
that diversity in higher education was necessary because a "diverse workforce is essential to
the success of global companies," Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief
of Exxon Mobil Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Grutter
(No. 02-241), and because "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps educated and
trained to command our nation's racially diverse enlisted ranks is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security." Consolidated Brief of Lt.
Gen. Julius W Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter,
(No. 02-241).The Court paid special attention to these political imperatives in its decision
in Grutter, quoting liberally from the briefs and embracing their central tenet that diversity
in higher education is necessary for the political and economic health of the nation. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33; see also Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political
Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REv. 113 (2003);Jeffirey
Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, N.Y Timas, June 1, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 54 ("In
both California and Texas, the political pressures to achieve racial diversity proved so
overwhelming that when each state's universities were forbidden to take race into account
in the admissions process, they simply refused to accept the decline in [B]lack and His-
panic enrollment that inevitably followed.").
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I. EDUCATION LAW AND POLICY IN CALIFORNIA
To appreciate the legal and policy context of Castaneda and Daniel,
one must look to the judicial decisions and legislative enactments that
have shaped public education in California. This part discusses the struc-
ture of California's integrated kindergarten through college ("K-16")
school system, California's long history of school finance litigation, and
California's affirmative action law.
A. K- 16 Education in California
As a result of demographic shifts and government largess in the
middle of the last century, California boasts one of the most highly inte-
grated primary, secondary, and higher education systems in the country.'
In 1960, confronted with a tidal wave of student enrollment stemming
from the baby boom, California adopted a Master Plan for Higher Educa-
tion9 that has since become "a national model that other states have tried
to emulate."1 The Master Plan "defined state goals for higher education,
assigned responsibility for achieving those goals, provided the necessary
authority and resources, and by linking those goals to very visible and
understandable commitments to the public, had a built-in mechanism of
accountability."1 It established a hierarchical three-tier system of universi-
ties, colleges, and junior colleges and guaranteed every California high
school graduate the opportunity to enroll in one of the system's schools."
The oversight board has altered the admissions criteria for the three units
on a regular basis to respond to the shifting demographics of the state's
secondary school population and to ensure college access to all California
students without compromising the academic quality of the institutions.
The state's guarantee that all students would have a place in a state-
funded institution of higher education required an increased commitment
on the part of the higher education community to public secondary edu-
cation. Universities became deeply involved in the planning of primary
and secondary school curricula and governance, as well as in myriad out-
reach programs that establish articulated pathways between high school
8. See Anthony Lising Antonio & Samuel H. Bersola, Working Toward K-16 Coher-
ence in California, in FROM HIGH SCHOOL To COLLEGE, supra note 3, at 31.
9. LIAISON COMM. OF THE STATE BD. OF EDUC. AND THE REGENTS OF THE UNIV. OF
CAL., A MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN CALIFORNIA, 1960-1975, at xi-xii (1960)
[hereinafter MASTER PLANI].
10. Sara Hebel, Schwarzenegger Strong-Arms Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Apr. 9,
2004, at A21.
11. UNIV. OF CAL. MASTER PLAN ADVISORY GROUP, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: A
PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPING A NEW MASTER PLAN 2 (2002).
12. See MASTER PLAN, supra note 9, at 1-5.
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and college.13 For example, in a 2002 report to the state legislature con-
cerning revisions of the state Master Plan for Higher Education, a faculty
advisory group noted that "[t]he University of California recognizes the
reciprocal links that bind together its future with the quality of public
elementary and secondary education in the state."
14
These reciprocal links have become strained in recent years as the
tension between failing to maintain rigorous standards at the secondary
education level and achieving diversity at the higher education level has
increased."5 As high schools become less capable of meeting their educa-
tional obligations, colleges have increasingly taken on a remedial role.'6 As
competition among institutions of higher education has reached new
heights and the costs of remediation have skyrocketed, universities have
become increasingly loath to dilute their standards in order to accommo-
date students whose academic preparation is lacking." Compounding
these problems is the well-founded fear that without some sort of race-
based affirmative action, California's higher education system will quickly
homogenize at each of the three tiers. 8
13. For example, the California Education Round Table established a programmatic
arm, the Intersegmental Coordinating Committee ("ICC"), composed of faculty and
students from all segments of the K-16 system. The ICC developed articulation docu-
ments and math and English standards for the system that attempted "to clarify the
relationship between graduation standards and expected competencies for entering college
freshmen." Antonio & Bersola, supra note 8, at 33.
14. UNrv. OF CAL. MASTER PLAN ADVISORY GROUP, supra note 11, at 1.
15. For colleges obligated to admit students from the states' high schools, those
schools' academic failures threaten the colleges' ability to maintain rigorous admissions
standards. Since most failing schools are composed predominantly of students of color and
students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, colleges striving for diversity feel the
need to adapt admissions standards most acutely.
16. See Jennifer R. Rowe, High School Exit Exams Meet IDEA-An Examination of
the History, Legal Ramifications, and Implications for Local School Administrators and Teachers,
2004 B.YU. EDUC. & L.J. 75, 90 (noting that one-fourth of all college enrollees need
remediation in at least one subject area). The most tempestuous debate about the role of
remedial education at the college level came when the City University of New York
("CUNY") moved to phase out its remediation program in order to boost its academic
prestige. Such a move is in keeping with a nationwide trend to make public higher educa-
tion more stratified and exclusionary. For an incisive discussion of the CUNY controversy,
see Patricia J. Gumport & Michael N. Bastedo, Academic Stratification and Endemic Conflict:
Remedial Education Policy at CUNY, 24 REv. HIGHER Enuc. 333 (2001).
17. See, e.g., Gumport & Bastedo, supra note 16, at 337-42.
18. See, e.g., Richard Morgan, California May Ban Extra Points forAP Courses, CHRON.
HIGHER ED.,June 21, 2002, at A23. In the debate about whether or not to drop the GPA-
enhancing effect of honors and Advanced Placement courses, the tension between univer-
sities' own educational missions and their obligations to primary and secondary education
became clear. Those who supported the enhancements argued that high school students
needed incentives to undertake challenging coursework before arriving at college to en-
sure that "the colleges will not make themselves high schools." Id. But the state legislature's
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Two vectors have shaped the legal and public policy context of this
dilemma. At the primary and secondary levels, the school finance reform
movement has sought to improve the quality of education in the state's
poorest schools. In higher education, various forms of affirmative action
in the pre- and post-Proposition 2099 environment have attempted to
ensure diversity in spite of clearly differential access to college preparatory
resources throughout the state.
B. School Finance in California:The Promises of Serrano v. Priest
In 1971 the California Supreme Court ruled in Serrano v. Priest" that
California's system of funding its public schools violated both the federal
and state constitutions.2 1 Two years later, in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,22 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a similar
school funding system in Texas did not violate the United States Constitu-
tion, overruling the California Supreme Court's decision in Serrano with
respect to federal law.23 Serrano's holding regarding the California constitu-
tion, however, remains good law.2 As the second Serrano2 court, which held
the state legislature's remedy enacted in response to Serrano I to be simi-
larly in violation of the state constitution, noted in 1976:
We-along with the trial court and the parties-think it is
clear that Rodriguez undercuts our decision in Serrano I to the
extent that we held the California public school financing sys-
tem (if proved to be as alleged) to be invalid as in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. However, as we made clear in
footnote 11 [of Serrano 1, our decision in Serrano I was based
Joint Committee to Develop a Master Plan adopted a different conception of higher edu-
cation's responsibilities, calling on the universities to "continue collaborating with
[elementary and secondary] schools to increase the rigor of all academic courses to
achieve the goals of reducing demand for remedial instruction among freshman students
and eliminating the current practice of providing additional weight to honors and AP
courses in admissions decisions." Id.
19. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, 5 31 (a) (amended 1996) ("The state shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public educa-
tion, or public contracting.").
20. 487 P2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) [hereinafter Serrano 11.
21. Id. at 1244.
22. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
23. Id. at 55.
24. See, e.g., Butt v. California, 842 P.2d 1240, 1249-51 (1992) (reaffirming
Serrano i's central holding that when the state undertakes to provide a good to which citi-
zens have a fundamental right, it must do so on a substantially equal basis to all).
25. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) [hereinafter Serrano Ill.
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not only on the provisions of the federal Constitution but on
the provisions of our own state Constitution as well.2"
Thus, in spite of the Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez, California
was bound to provide primary and secondary education of a judicially
mandated quality and on a substantially equal basis to all students in order
to meet the demands of the state constitution's education and equal pro-
tection provisions. 7 This mandate has shaped California's education policy
for over three decades.
2
The Serrano plaintiffs claimed that primary and secondary public
education was a fundamental right in California, and, as such, it could not
be denied to them on the basis of their membership in a suspect class
founded on wealth. 29 California's system of funding public schools pri-
marily on the basis of ad valorem property tax rates, the plaintiffs
contended, discriminated against poor children."5 Discrimination against
members of a suspect class in the domain of a fundamental right triggered
strict scrutiny, and the court found that the State did not meet its burden
in defending the funding system as a narrowly tailored means of further-
ing a substantial government interest.2  In Serrano II, the Court
summarized its Serrano I holding, thus:
For the reasons there stated and for the purposes of assessing our
state public school financing system in light of our state consti-
tutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws
(1) discrimination in educational opportunity on the basis of
district wealth involves a suspect classification, and (2) education
is a fundamental interest.
32
26. Id. at 949.
27. Id. at 957-58.
28. See Jeannie Oakes, Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and Failed State Policy:A Syn-
thesis of Expert Reports Prepared for Williams v. State of California, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1305, 1361-64 (2003) (describing the impact of Serrano on state education policy); see also
William H. Clune, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U. MIcH. J.L. RE-
FoRM 481, 489 (1995) (noting Serrano's impact on state education financing and tax policy
as a collateral effect of the constitutional mandate).
29. Serrano 1, 487 P2d 1241,1255 (Cal. 1971).
30. Id. at 1244-45.
31. Serrano 11, 557 P.2d at 952-53.
32. Id. at 951.
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1."Discrimination ... on the Basis of District Wealth
Involves a Suspect Classification"
The Serrano courts, like many courts in the late 1960s and early
1970s, recognized poverty as grounding a protected class.33 In this in-
stance, the high degree of state and local government complicity in
mediating the effects of wealth on educational resources compelled the
court to regard school funding as discriminatory on the basis of wealth.
The court said:
[W]e find the case unusual in the extent to which governmen-
tal action is the cause of the wealth classifications. The school
funding scheme is mandated in every detail by the California
Constitution and statutes. Although private residential and
commercial patterns may be partly responsible for the distribu-
tion of assessed valuation throughout the state, such patterns
are shaped and hardened by zoning ordinances and other gov-
ernmental land-use controls which promote economic
exclusivity. 4
The court's concern about wealth-based distinctions increases in proportion
to the government's involvement in the creation and perpetuation of legal
and policy structures that unequally distribute public goods across the so-
cioeconomic spectrum. This judicial solicitude is particularly well placed in
the area of public education, where the mantra of"local control" betrays the
extent to which state government is responsible for important features of
schooling, such as the initiation and maintenance of districting, school
funding schemes, and curriculum mandates.
2. "Education is a Fundamental Interest"
The court offered a capacious defense of public education that has
shaped the legal debate concerning school resources in California ever
since. According to the court:
[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship.Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
33. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Htaiv. L. P,.R. 7 (1969) (proffering an argu-
ment in favor of heightened protection for the economically disadvantaged).
34. Serrano I, 487 E2d at 1254.
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education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
3
1
Although the court limited its holding requiring equal funding of gov-
ernmental services to education, it did not expressly limit its definition of
education to primary and secondary education.3 6 A lower court has since
found that in Serrano, the California Supreme Court did not consider
whether Californians have a fundamental right to higher education.
37
However the court suggested that it might recognize such a right if pre-
sented with adequate evidence or if defined by the legislature."
Demands for equal educational opportunity exert a great deal of
"moral suasion."39 The Castaneda and Daniel plaintiffs capitalized on the
normative force of this movement by calling for equal access to higher
education.
C. Affirmative Action in California
On November 5, 1996, Californians voted to amend their state con-
stitution to outlaw racial (and other) preferences in public employment,
public education, and public contracting by approving Proposition 209,
provocatively titled the California Civil Rights Initiative." Many regarded
it as a staggering defeat for racial justice and diversity in higher educa-
tion. 1 Committed to equal access to higher education and recognizing
the political impossibility of maintaining a predominantly White system of
higher education in a largely Black and Latino state, the California higher
35. Id. at 1256-57 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
36. See id. at 1262-63 ("Although we intimate no views on other governmental
services, we are satisfied that, as we have explained, its uniqueness among public activities
clearly demonstrates that education must respond to the command of the [E]qual
[P]rotection [Cllause.").
37. Gurfinkel v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 175 Cal. Rptr. 201,204 (1981).
38. Id. at 203-04 n.3.
39. AvidanY. Cover, Is "Adequacy" a More "Political Question" Than "Equality?": The
Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L.
& PuB. PoL'Y 403,405 (2002).
40. See CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 31(a) (amended 1996).
41. See Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the
California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1149 (1996) (arguing that
the color-blind vision of Proposition 209 would eventuate in "a uniform American
culture, in which the culture of racial minorities and non[W]hite ethnicities are peripheral
to mainstream life"); H.G. Reza, Marchers Rally for Affirmative Action, Latino Rights
Demonstration, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1996, at B5 (describing a protest against Proposition
209 at which a speaker contended that supporters of the ballot measure "want us to pick
the strawberries and work in hotels, but they don't want us to get an education").
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education community searched furiously for race-neutral admissions pro-
cedures that would prevent a serious reduction in minority enrollment on
the state's public university campuses.
4 2
The University of California ("UC") and California State Univer-
sity systems dropped race as a criterion in evaluating applicants in 1998,
but they increased their outreach efforts to increase the number of mi-
nority applicants.43 By the spring of 2002, the UC system admitted as
many minority students as freshmen as it had before it abandoned formal
affirmative action procedures.1
4
The introduction of a percentage plan admissions schedule that
guaranteed every student in the top four percent of her high school class
admissions to at least one of the UC schools helped the universities match
their pre-Proposition 209 minority enrollment."5 Although the percent-
age plan dictated admissions to the UC system, students still had to apply
to individual UC campuses, each of which had its own admissions crite-
ria.46 This admissions program satisfied the legal demands of Proposition
209 because it was facially neutral, not formally taking race into account.
The percent plan, however, will only maintain or increase diversity
on UC campuses if the California public school system remains heavily
segregated. 7 This percentage plan system also wrests a significant amount
of discretion from UC admissions officials and places it in the hands of
42. Proposition 209 was challenged almost immediately in federal court. Upon
challenge, all California institutions of public higher education were enjoined from im-
plementing Proposition 209. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 E Supp. 1480
(N.D. Cal. 1996). The Ninth Circuit then vacated the injunction and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari without comment. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F3d
1431 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997).
43. See, e.g., Sara Hebel, Court Ruling Could End Outreach to Minority Students in
California, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Dec. 15, 2000, at A41.
44. Bob Laird, Bending Admissions to Political Ends, CHRON. HICHER ED., May 17,
2002, at BI1.
45. Patrick Healy, U of California to Admit Top 4% From Every High School, CHRON.
HIGHER ED., Apr. 2, 1999, at A36.
46. See id. at A36-37.
47. See Benjamin Forest, A Policy That Depends on Segregation, N.Y. TMES, Mar. 29,
2003, at A11 (arguing that percent plans like the ones in California and Texas "ignore 0 a
forgotten reality of the Texas plan: access and diversity in universities will come at the
price of continued segregation in high schools. Racial integration in primary and secon-
dary schools was once a national priority; now segregation is a prerequisite for a new kind
of politically correct 'affirmative action' "); see also Jeffrey Selingo, What States Aren't Saying
About the 'X-Percent Solution,' CIHRON. HIGHER ED.,June 2,2000, at A31, A33:
[Clritics say the policies are cynical: By using high schools with large minor-
ity populations to yield more [B]lack and Hispanic students, the approach
exploits educational segregation.... Proponents of affirmative action say that
class-rank systems discourage states from integrating high schools, and that,
in the end, the policies won't increase the number of minority students at
public institutions.
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high school teachers and guidance officers: The high schools effectively
determine who will be admitted to UC campuses by their administration
of grades, the singular determinant of admissions for the top four percent
of each high school's students." Indeed, the UC system distrusts the pub-
lic schools enough to ask the schools for the top ten percent of students
and then to perform their own ranking of the top four percent on the
basis of grades in fifteen core courses.49
Critics of the percentage plan initially understood it to signal the
higher education community's complete abrogation of any responsibility
for public education reform. By establishing the four percent admissions
gateway without any demands that public high schools improve the qual-
ity of education offered, the University removed incentives for any
substantive educational improvements."0 If UC schools will accept the top
four percent of students regardless of their pre-college preparation, critics
reasoned, public high schools would lose any incentive to improve their
offerings."1 "You're letting schools off the hook," accused John G. Davies,
chairman of the Board of Regents of the University of California. "This
does not raise the bar."'2 Similarly, Abigail Thernstrom, a member of the
United States Committee on Civil Rights, said, "We're playing little
games to allow us to ignore the appalling racial gap in achievement in
elementary schools, and this just continues to get these schools off the
hook. These plans compound a moral problem that Americans should be
up in arms about."
5 3
It seems that these anxieties were either misplaced or the disingenu-
ous ranting of those intent on maintaining the post-Proposition 209
status quo in California. Following the marked shift of power between
higher and secondary education initiated by the introduction of the per-
centage plans, concern in the California higher education community for
the quality of public secondary education grew greatly Regents and Uni-
versity administrators concerned about the possible dilution of academic
quality on their campuses sought to exert as much pressure as possible on
secondary schools to improve the quality of education they offered in order
to shore up higher education's resources against the imminent tide of po-
tentially under-qualified students. 4 For example, as a way of incentivizing
students' pursuit of advanced work in secondary schools, the UC Regents
adopted a policy of adding extra points for each honors or Advanced
48. Selingo, supra note 47, at A31-32.
49. Id. at A34.
50. Healy, supra note 45, at A37; Selingo, supra note 47, at A32.
51. Healy, supra note 45, at A37; Selingo, supra note 47, at A31.
52. Healy, supra note 45, at A37.
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Placement class taken in recalculating and reranking the grade point aver-
ages ("GPAs") of the top ten percent. The combination of this policy and
the unequal access to college preparatory resources discussed above gave
rise to the Daniel and Castaneda lawsuits.
II. LITIGATING FOR COLLEGE ACCESS
The Castaneda and Daniel lawsuits were predicated on a particular
understanding of the place of higher education in contemporary Ameri-
can society. This Part therefore begins by arguing why higher education
today should be treated akin to a fundamental right. It then describes the
Castaneda and Daniel lawsuits in more detail, with particular attention
paid to the ways the cases fit into the California education framework-
encompassing its statutory, legal, and political elements. Moreover, this
Part attempts to limn the lawsuits in such a way as to distinguish them
from conventional school finance reform and affirmative action lawsuits.
As neither case eventuated in a court judgment,"5 the discussion focuses
on the institutional and legislative, rather than judicial, responses initiated
by the litigation.
A. Higher Education As a Fundamental Right
At the center of the Castaneda and Daniel lawsuits is a belief that ac-
cess to college is a fundamental right, necessary for students' actuation of
their aspirations, if not simply their economic viability and social vitality.
While higher education remains non-compulsory, the tectonic economic
and political shifts of the last three decades have brought higher education
more in line with the criteria the Serrano court used to determine that
primary and secondary education were fundamental rights. The Serrano
court held that education was a fundamental right because such "educa-
tion is a major determinant of an individual's chances for economic and
social success in our competitive society; second, education is a unique
influence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation in
political and community life."56 Although higher education might not
have met these criteria in the political economy of 1971, times have
changed. In 2004, higher education is as much, if not more, a determinant
of one's economic and social success and one's civic disposition as are
55. The consent decree in Castaneda was entered by the court on June 9, 2003. See
Press Release, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Set-
dement Reached in Suit Over Discriminatory Admissions Process at UC Berkeley (June
17, 2003), available at http://www.Iccr.com/ucsettlement.doc. There has been no court
judgment issued in Daniel. See infa note 148.
56. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56 (Cal. 1971).
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primary and secondary education.17 As such, it might finally be possible to
bring higher education within the ambit of the Serrano mandate.
In Serrano, the California Supreme Court recognized a fundamental
right to public education in California based on five factors:
(1) "education is essential in maintaining what several commentators have
termed 'free enterprise democracy'-that is, preserving an individual's
opportunity to compete successfully in the economic marketplace, despite
a disadvantaged background;"5 (2) "education is universally relevant;"5 9
(3) "public education continues over a lengthy period of life-between 10
and 13 years;" (4) "education is unmatched in the extent to which it
molds the personality of the youth of society;""' and (5) "education is so
important that the state has made it compulsory-not only in the re-
quirement of attendance but also by assignment to a particular district and
school."
62
The sole effort to apply these criteria to higher education was un-
successful though not preclusive. In Gurfinkel, the plaintiff attempted to
assert that the Serrano I right to public education included a fundamental
right to higher education. 3 The California Court of Appeals found that
the Serrano courts did not describe a fundamental right to higher educa-
tion because Serrano L which was reaffirmed by Serrano II, partly said that
(a) education lasted from ten to thirteen years, and (b) education was
compulsory.6" Rather than holding that no fundamental right to higher
education exists in California, the Gurfinkel court suggested that it might
recognize such a right if the plaintiff provided evidence to support it or if
the legislature defined it.6 It seems that the requisite evidence is now
available. While a full exposition of the application of the Serrano criteria
to higher education is unnecessary here, it should be noted that they ap-
ply with certain force to higher education in the contemporary American
57. SeeJEm NFER CHEESEMAN DAY & Enic C. NEWBURGFR, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, THE
BIG PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHEric ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNINGS
(2002) (noting that workers with a college degree earn nearly twice as much as those with
only a high-school degree over a forty-year working life); see also Sidney Verba et al., Race,
Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States, 23 BRIT. J. Po. Sci. 453
(1993) (describing the positive correlation between higher education and civic participa-
tion, especially among minority racial and ethnic groups).
58. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1258-59.
59. Id. at 1259 ("Not every person finds it necessary to call upon the fire depart-
ment or even the police in an entire lifetime. Relatively few are on welfare. Every person,




63. Gurfinkel v. L.A. Cmty. Col]. Dist., 175 Cal. Rptr. 201, 202 (1981).
64. Id. at 203.
65. Id. at 203-04 n.3.
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political economy. As noted above, higher education is just as determina-
tive, if not more so, of an individual's economic and civic utility in
contemporary America as primary and secondary education used to be.66
Indeed, even the California Court of Appeals has recognized the impor-
tance of higher education today. In Kirk v. Board of Regents of the University
of California,67 a challenge to durational residence requirements for atten-
dance at state colleges, the court "fully recognize[d] the value of higher
education." However, the court declined to accord it the same status as
"food, clothing and shelter ... [because] [t]he durational residence re-
quirement for attendance at publicly financed institutions of higher
learning do [sic] not involve similar risks [of'great suffering and even loss
of life.']."68
The final Serrano I factor is the most difficult to refute. Higher edu-
cation is not compulsory. Indeed, the Gurfinkel court's holding that higher
education was not a fundamental right on the flimsy reasoning that, be-
cause Serrano I"address[ed] 'compulsory' public education continuing over
a '10 [to] 13' year period, the court in Serrano I clearly was contemplating
education ranging from kindergarten through grade twelve. Neither col-
lege nor community college education is compulsory.'"69 While this is
indisputably true, the compulsoriness factor ought to be outweighed by
the gravity of the four other factors. The simple fact that a public good is
not compulsorily consumed ought not to allow the state to distribute it
on an unequal basis to those who seek to consume it, especially when
their economic and political participation hangs in the balance.
No California court has directly determined whether formal access to
higher education constitutes an affirmative right as embodied in the sweep-
ing mandate of Serrano .'0 Even if it is not determined to be such, it is
likely, given the California courts' demonstrated regard for higher educa-
tion, that they would consider it to be very important. In the context of the
Castaneda and Daniel lawsuits, such a high regard for higher education is
crucial. Had the lawsuits eventuated in full adjudication, the courts' regard
66. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
67. 78 Cal. Rptr. 260,266 (1969).
68. Id. at 266-67.
69. Gurfinkel, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
70. The most significant movement in this area of law has come in relation to un-
documented immigrants' access to higher education. A series of cases in the late 1980s and
early 1990s challenged the state's requirement that undocumented inmigrants pay non-
resident tuition and fees to the University of California and California State University
system. In those cases, "the court did not consider subsidized public university education to
be a findamental or even an important interest. Instead, the court decided that precluding
undocumented students from being classified as residents furthered legitimate state inter-
ests, such as preferring to educate California's lawful residents and not subsidizing
violations of law." Lucila Rosas, Comment, Is Postsecondary Education a Fundamental Right?
Applying Serrano v. Priest to Leticia "A," 16 CHIcANo-LATNo L. REV. 69, 77 (1995) (em-
phasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).
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for higher education would likely have been partially dispositive of its
receptiveness to the plaintiffs' complaints, since equal protection com-
plaints of the sort the plaintiffs make hinge in large part on the courts'
determination of whether the good to which they are being denied access
is one to which they have an affirmative fundamental right.
B. Castaneda v. Regents
In February of 1999, a coalition of students and organizations filed a
class action lawsuit alleging that the admissions process at UC Berkeley
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.' Plaintiffs in Jesus Rios v. University of Califor-
nia Regents, 2 later renamed Castaneda v. Regents, included rejected African
American, Latino, and Filipino applicants to UC Berkeley; 3 three minor-
ity organizations representing future applicants to Berkeley;" and five
legal advocacy organizations."
A review of the Berkeley admissions process is important to
understand the substance of the lawsuit. The Castaneda plaintiffs challenged
the Berkeley admissions process that was in place prior to the University of
California's introduction of the percentage plan.76 However the Berkeley
admissions procedures did not change significantly after the plan's adoption,
so the same claims of discrimination lodged against the pre-percent-plan
admissions process would still pertain after its adoption.7 All applicants to
Berkeley-including those who superseded the percent-plan threshold
71. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Jesus
Rios v. Univ. of Cal. Regents (N.D. Cal. 1999) (No. C99-0525) [hereinafter Castatieda
Complaint].
72. Id.
73. At the time of the lawsuit, these students were attending college elsewhere.
74. The minority organizations included the Imani Youth Council of the Oakland
NAACP, the California League of United Latin American Citizens, and the Kababayan
Alliance, a Filipino high school student organization.
75. Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California,
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and the ACLU of
Northern California constituted the five advocacy organizations.
76. Castaneda Complaint, supra note 71, at 3.
77. Prior to the adoption of the percent plan, the University of California main-
tamined general admissions criteria for all students. In order to be able to attend at least one
UC campus, the University required that applicants "have taken certain college prepara-
tory courses, that they achieve GPAs of 3.3 or above in those courses or, for applicants
with lower GPAs, certain scores on the SAT or the American College Test ('ACT') stan-
dardized tests; and that they have taken certain SAT II standardized tests." Id. at 14. After
the University adopted a percentage plan system, it merely substituted the four-percent
class rank as the gateway criterion.
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and were guaranteed admissions to one of the University's campuses,
those from in-state who did not fall within the top four percent of their
classes but were applying to Berkeley anyway, and those from out-of-
state-are now assigned an academic score and a comprehensive score by
admissions officers." Forty percent of the admissions decisions are based
solely on the academic criteria. The remaining sixty percent are filled
based on a comprehensive score, which is determined by those six
academic criteria plus personal characteristics and non-academic
achievement. At least seventy-five percent of the academic score must be
based on three academic criteria: "(1)'uncapped' GPA, (2) scores on the
Schoolastic Aptitude Test ('SAT'), or the American College Test ('ACT'),
and three SAT II tests, and (3) college preparatory courses completed and
the level of achievement in those courses, including Advanced Placement
('AP') and International Baccalaureate Higher Level ('IBHL')."79 Prior to
the adoption of this particular iteration of its admissions process, Berkeley
capped GPAs at 4.0. However, crucial to the initiation of the Castaneda
lawsuit, "under the current process, applicants can be assigned an
'uncapped' GPA higher than 4.0 if they have taken AP, IBHL, and UC-
approved honors courses"I' Quite clearly, a student cannot have a GPA
above 4.0 without the availability of advanced classes in the applicant's
high school. 1 Plaintiffs grounded their disparate impact claims on the
differential access to these classes across the state.
The manner in which the Berkeley admissions process failed to ac-
commodate the academic deficiencies of a significant portion of the state's
public high school students prompted the Castaneda lawsuit. The plaintiffs
challenged "the discriminatory failure of Defendants to give full and fair
consideration to applications for undergraduate admission to the
[Ulniversity of California at Berkeley ... from Plaintiffs and those they
seek to represent."8 2 Their disparate impact claim challenged admissions
policies and practices "that, without adequate educational justification,
disproportionately deny to qualified minority applicants, including Plain-




81. The Castaneda plaintiffs noted:
UC Berkeley admitted approximately 47.3% of the applicants for Fall 1998
freshman admission who had GPAs of 4.0 or higher, including 43.2% (2,185
of 4,352) of those applicants identifying themselves as [W]hite; 39.7% (412
of 1,038) of those applicants identifying themselves as Chicano or Latino;
38.5% (89 of 231) of those applicants identifying themselves as African
American; and 31.6% (156 of 494) of those applicants identifying themselves
as Pilhpino [sic] Americans.
Id. at 13.
82. Id. at 3.
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studies.""9 The plaintiffi contended that the University's operative defini-
tion of academic merit was too narrow to accommodate the racially
differential access to academic opportunities across the state.84 They spe-
cifically objected to Berkeley's granting of "unjustified preferential
consideration to applicants who have taken certain courses that are less
accessible in high schools attended largely by African American, Latino,
and Pilipino [sic] American students.""5 Further, they contended that ad-
missions officers used even less formal criteria in a manner that
discriminated against these groups: "Even the [admissions] policy's provi-
sion for the admission of students who fail to meet academic eligibility
requirements, called 'admissions by exception,' has been implemented by
Defendants to disproportionately favor [W]hite applicants.""
Plaintiffs alleged that, in the wake of Proposition 209 and the Uni-
versity's enactment of the Proposition's prohibitions in the form of
Resolution Special Policy 1 ("SP-1"), 7 Berkeley adopted a policy in
which:
[i]n addition to explicitly prohibiting admissions readers from
considering minority applicants' racial and ethnic background in
the admissions process, readers no longer rely on a mathematical
formula to evaluate applicants. Instead, readers use their own
discretion to assign scores to applicants after reading applicants'
files. The revisions to the policy have resulted in readers placing
even greater emphasis on applicants' standardized test scores and
considering more favorably applicants who had greater access to
courses not equally available to all California high school
students.88
As one of the plaintiffs' attorneys, Katayoon Majd of the ACLU of
Northern California, said, "UC Berkeley went far beyond ending affirma-
tive action. It discriminated against students of color."9 Thus plaintiffi
83. Id.
84. Id. ("A more fair and complete definition of merit would create a more fair and
equitable admissions process for all applicants.").
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Resolution SP-1 enshrined the anti-affirmative action language of Proposition
209 in University of California policy. The Resolution stated that "the University of
California shall not use race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as criteria for
admission to the University or to any program of study." See UNIV. OF CAL. BD. OF REGENTS,
POLicy ENStuRiNG EQUAL TRsaATMENr: ADMISSIONS (SP-1) (approved July 20, 1995), available at
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/compreview/spl.pdf.
88. Castaneda Complaint, supra note 71, at 12-13.
89. Press Release, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Settlement Reached in Suit Over
Discriminatory Admissions Process at UC Berkeley (Jun. 17,2003) (on file with author).
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sought to enjoin Berkeley's admissions process and demanded that the
school adopt:
less discriminatory alternatives ... that are effective in selecting
students in a manner consistent with UC Berkeley's mission of
admitting students who demonstrate exceptional academic or
personal achievement and talent, who will contribute to the
campus community, and who will bring diversity of personal
experience and background to the intellectual and cultural en-
vironment of the campus.9'
Castaneda, ultimately settled by a consent decree in June of 2003,1 initi-
ated a several-years-long discussion and policy transition at Berkeley and on
other UC campuses about the operational definition of merit in the sys-
tem's admissions process. In May 2001, the UC Regents rescinded Special
Policy 1, which prohibited the consideration of race and other personal
criteria in University admissions, by passing Resolution 28 ("RE-28").
9 2
Thereafter Berkeley was free to employ a wide range of academic and per-
sonal factors in its decision making process. Upon the recommendation of
the faculty admissions committee, the administration adopted a "unitary"
admissions policy that no longer differentiated between "academic" and
"comprehensive" scores and that afforded admissions officers considerably
more latitude in weighing the various factors they could consider in mak-
ing admissions decisions. As the faculty committee's report explained, the
unitary policy:
[i]s very similar to those we have used for the past five years in
that ... no single factor will have a pre-assigned weight, al-
though academics will continue to predominate; and all
achievements will be evaluated in context. The criteria to be
90. Castaneda Complaint, supra note 71, at 17.
91. See [Proposed] Consent Decree at 3-4, Castaneda (June 9, 2003) (imposing on
UC Berkeley a number of reporting requirements, including data on admissions numbers
disaggregated by race and ethnicity, as well as draft and final versions of their admissions
procedures and admissions officer training materials; also retaining Yale psychologist
Robert Sternberg as a consultant to the Berkeley admissions office to assist in evaluation
of the school's operational definition of"merit").
92. RE-28 explicitly rescinded SP-1 and Special Policy 2 ("SP-2"), a similar resolu-
tion governing hiring and contracts in the University system. In passing RE-28, the Regents
noted that they believed themselves to be in full compliance with the mandates of Proposi-
tion 209, as codified in the California State Constitution, CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 31, but also
that "some individuals perceive that the University does not welcome their enrollment at its
campuses." See TIa REGENTS OF TE UNTV. OF CAL., POLICY ON FusE ADMISSIONS, EM-
PLOYMENT, AND CONTRACTING POLICIES-RESOTION RESCINDING SP-1 AND SP-2
(approved May 16, 2001), available at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/regents/policies/
6031.html; Minutes of the Regents of the University of California 1-3 (May 16, 2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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used in the new process are exactly the same as those used pre-
viously: none have been added and none have been removed,
rather the two previous lists have been combined into a single
set.... We believe that the unitary process will be both more
transparent and more educationally sound than the current
two-tier process, which requires that we draw artificially rigid
lines between "academic" and "other" criteria. In addition, us-
ing a single score will streamline the process in that we do not
have to repeat the ranking, tie-breaking, and selection process
for each tier. This, in turn, will allow readers to devote more
time to cases that are on the "border" between admission and
denial. 93
Whether this system satisfies the mandates of Proposition 209 is a
hotly contested topic. Indeed, a recent UC Regents report found that UC
schools admitted Black and Latino students at slightly higher rates than
their test scores would predict, and Asian American students at slightly
lower rates.9 4 Whether these disparities are a result of policies that contra-
vene state law or are attributable to race-neutral factors is debatable and
currently under investigation at the behest of John J. Moores, the Chair-
man of the Board of Regents. He is skeptical that the precipitous rise in
minority enrollment following the enactment of the unitary admissions
policy could result from a policy in compliance with state law.99 Indeed,
he has "alleged that admissions officers have been using the system's 'com-
prehensive review' admissions policy to skirt Proposition 209."
Regardless of the ultimate conclusions about the legality of the UC
and Berkeley admissions processes, it is evident that Castaneda exerted
extraordinary pressure on the higher education community and spurred
them to substantive change. The wording of the faculty's recommenda-
93. UC BERKELEY ADMISSIONS, ENROLLMENT, AND PREPARATORY EDUC. COMM., R.E-
PORT TO THE UC REGENTS ON BERKELEY'S ADMISSIONS POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND
OUTCOMES 11 (2001).
94. UC ELIGIBILITY AN]D ADMISSIONS STUDY GROUP, FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT (Apr. 2004).
95. See Peter Schmidt, U of California Report Fails to Settle Debate Over Whether Racial
Bias Occurs in Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://
chronicle.com/prm/daily/2004/04/2004043001 n.htm.
96. Id.
97. The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), seems
to implicitly endorse the "comprehensive review" admissions program, which manifests
the "truly individualized consideration" that Justice O'Connor regarded as the "hallmark[]
of a narrowly tailored plan." Id. at 334. Whether the Supreme Court's determination that
such plans pass federal constitutional scrutiny will have any bearing on the debate around
affirmative action in California, where the dispute centers on state constitutional provi-
sions, is yet to be determined.
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tions and the committee's insistence that all applications be evaluated
"contextually" mean that admissions officers must pay special attention to
the academic offerings and environment of the applicant's school com-
munity. These changes reflect Berkeley's commitment to diversity and its
responsiveness to the particular claims made by the Castaneda plaintiffs
regarding the contours of the school's admissions criteria and proce-
dures." Likewise a longstanding, unresolved discussion in the California
State Legislature's Joint Committee to Develop a Master Plan for Higher
Education regarding GPA bonuses for Advanced Placement classes reflects
the extent to which Castaneda placed this issue on the public higher edu-
cation agenda for the state.99
C. Daniel v. California
A similar conjunction of individuals and organizations to the plain-
tiffs in Castaneda then filed an obvious complementary case, Daniel v.
California, which challenged the unequal distribution of college prepara-
tory resources throughout California's public high schools."° The ACLU
filed the lawsuit on behalf of the Latino and Black students at Inglewood
High School, a public school in California that, at the time, offered only
three AP courses."" Plaintiffs claimed that they were "being denied equal
and adequate access to Advanced Placement ("AP") courses by the State
of California and by the State's local school districts"'1 2 in violation of the
equal protection' 3 and education 4 clauses of the California Constitution
and California statutory laws. The State of California, the State Board of
Education, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Inglewood
Unified School District, and the Acting Superintendent of the Inglewood
Unified School District were all named as defendants.' 5 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the denial of access to AP classes in the Inglewood schools was
98. Berkeley's unitary admissions process involved a significant amount of "norm-
ing," a process by which application readers learn to compare applicants both to the entire
applicant pool and, more specifically, to other applicants from a given student's high school
or community. Compare UC BERKELEY ADMISSIONs, ENROLLMENT, AND PREPARATORY EDUC.
COMM., supra note 93, at 13 (describing evaluation criteria for students from "particularly
strong schools") with id. at 14 (describing Berkeley's commitment to providing "some
measure of opportunity to students from low-income and disadvantaged backgrounds").
99. See Morgan, supra note 18, at A23.
100. See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 1, Daniel v. California (L.A. Super. Ct. 1999) (No. B
C214156) [hereinafter Daniel Complaint].
101. Id. at 4-5.
102. Id. at 1.
103. CAt. CONST. art. I, § 16.
104. CAL. CONST. art. IX, 55 1, 11.
105. Daniel Complaint, supra note 100, at 1.
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the product of a system-wide failure to protect the interests of Black and
Latino schoolchildren."°
AP offerings throughout the state were clearly unequal at the time
of the lawsuit, and that inequality was closely tied to schools' ethnic and
racial compositions. While some predominantly White and Asian high
schools were offering multiple sections of more than fourteen different
AP courses:
[m]any other California high schools offer[ed] only a single
section of 2 or 3 different AP courses. 177 [of 1004] California
high schools [did] not offer any AP classes. While these differ-
ences in AP offerings [were] related to several factors including
school size and location, they [were] closely bound up with a
high school's racial composition. 17
For example, predominantly White and Asian schools with between 500
and 1000 students offered an average of 3.57 AP courses, while similarly-
sized predominantly Black and Latino schools offered only 2.07 courses on
average." Predominantly White and Asian schools with 2000 or more stu-
dents offered 10.12 AP courses on average, while similarly-sized
predominantly Black and Latino schools averaged only 6.75 AP courses."9
In their complaint, plaintifl cited the particularly egregious disparity
between their high school and nearby Arcadia High School: Inglewood
(97.4% Black and Latino) offered only three AP courses, none of which was
in math or science, while Arcadia (8.4% Black and Latino) offered eighteen
AP courses, including six in math and science."" Moreover, nearly 130,000
students attended the 177 public high schools in California that did not
offer any AP courses.'1 I
This disparity, plaintiffs claimed, was not due to a shortage of stu-
dent interest.t1 2 Indeed, they contended that "when high schools offer an
AP program and inform their student body about the advantages of tak-
ing AP courses, their students will enroll in these courses.""' They cited
the example of Los Angeles' Garfield High School, made famous by the
106. Id.
107. JEANNIE OAKES ET AL., REMEDYING UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESSFUL
PARTICIPATION IN ADVANCED PLACEMENT COURSES IN CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOLS: A PRO-
POSED ACTION PLAN 6 (2000) (report submitted to the court as part of the settlement
discussions between parties in Danieo .
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id.
110. Daniel Complaint, supra note 100, at 5.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id.
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movie Stand and Deliver.' In 1976, Garfield offered no AP math classes.
Under the direction of teacher Jaime Escalante, the AP calculus program
was established and grew exponentially." 5 In 1986, 129 Garfield students
took the exam and sixty percent of them earned college credits; "[t]hat
year, only three high schools in the country had more students take the
exam." 6 Given such a success story, no matter how aberrant it may be,
the plaintiffs contended that it was the:
Defendants' policy and practice of failing to assure equal and
adequate access to AP course offerings to qualified high school
students [that] create[d] substantial disparities in the quality
and extent of educational opportunities, and further perpetu-
ate[d] educational inequalities, particularly for students
enrolled in predominantly Black and Latino schools. " 7
Thus "[b]y denying students who would enroll in AP courses if of-
fered by their schools equal and adequate access to AP courses"" ' the
defendants violated the students' equal protection rights and denied the
students their right to California's guarantee of substantially equal educa-
tional opportunities."'
California's detailed statutory framework for education and its
highly integrated secondary and post-secondary education system pro-
vided a fertile ground for the Daniel plaintiffs' claims. The extent to which
California public institutions of secondary and higher education formally
recognized AP courses as an important component of college preparation
strengthened plaintiffs' equal protection and education clause challenges.
As the complaint noted, "Advanced Placement courses are recognized by
the California Education Code, education experts, and Departments of
Education throughout the United States as an integral component of high
school students' curricula."'1 2 Specifically, the Daniel plaintiff; cited the
state's AP fee waiver program as evidence of the official integration of the
AP program into the state's educational practice and administration.' Cali-
fornia Education Code Section 52240(b) establishes a fee-waiver program
for Advanced Placement exams because "it is the intent of the Legislature
... that certain state funding that currently is provided to school districts be
made available to provide financial assistance to economically disadvantaged
114. STAND ANDDELIVER (American Playhouse 1988), cited in Daniel Complaint, supra
note 100, at 8.
115. Daniel complaint, supra note 100, at 8.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 9.
119. SeeCAL. CoNsr. art. 1, 5§ 7,16; art. IX,§ 1, 5.
120. Daniel Complaint, supra note 100, at 2.
121. Id. at 17-19.
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pupils in the payment of [A]dvanced [P]lacement examination fees." '122 If
their tax dollars subsidized the AP exam fees of economically disadvan-
taged students, the plaintiffs reasoned, then denying them access to AP
classes and exams was tantamount to forcing them to fund discrimination
against themselves.
123
Similarly, the high level of integration of California's secondary and
higher education systems worked within a statutory framework that
manifested an extraordinary solicitude towards students' college prepared-
ness. Consequently, the plaintiffs were able to marshal a large amount of
evidence that the state regarded college preparatory curriculum in gen-
eral, and AP exams in particular, as an important component of secondary
education.' Specifically, they referred to California Education Code Sec-
tion 51228(a), which requires all California school districts to offer "a
curriculum that meets the requirements and prerequisites for admission to
the California institutions of post-secondary education.' ' 2 Although the
statutory language clearly mandates that students have access to a curricu-
lum that prepares them for any of the state's institutions of higher
education, including the junior colleges, colleges, and universities, the
plaintiffs asserted that they had an affirmative right to access to "a cur-
riculum that meets the admission requirements of the University of
California's most competitive campuses."'z6
The plaintiffs' claim also relied, in part, on the anti-tracking'27 lan-
guage in Section 66204 of the Education Code, which states that "there
shall be no policy or practice in any public elementary or secondary
school of directing, especially for cultural or linguistic reasons, any pupil
... away from choosing programs that prepare that pupil academically for
college."'' The mandatory college access provision, coupled with this ex-
plicit guarantee against tracking, seemed to militate against a college
preparatory curriculum that did not adequately prepare high school stu-
dents for acceptance to the flagship campuses of the California higher
education system.
122. Id. at 17.
123. Id. at 18.
124. Id. at 23-24.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Tracking "is the practice of placing students in stratified classes ... based on the
students' perceived abilities." Kevin G. Welner, Ability Tracking: What Role for the Courts?,
163 W ED. LAw R.EP. 565, 565 (2002). See generally JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How
SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY (1985). This provision guarantees that no student will be
tracked into an academic program that is insufficient to prepare him or her for higher
education.
128. Daniel Complaint, supra note 100, at 16-17.
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Finally, no doubt taking their cue from Castaneda, the Daniel plain-
tiffs attacked the manner in which the state's higher education system
used AP exams to further disadvantage already disadvantaged students. 29
The UC system, plaintiffs contended, used:
the AP program in four distinct ways: by increasing the GPAs
of applicants who took AP classes; by granting full college
credit to students who obtained a score of 3 or higher on the
AP test; by allowing AP students to place out of introductory
courses; and by giving preference to applicants who took ad-
vanced courses.
130
This state-sanctioned privileging of one particular type of curriculum
over another, especially within a context of radical inequality in access to
that curriculum, formed a strong basis for the Daniel complaint and suc-
cessfully tied it in with the lobbying efforts that followed the Castaneda
lawsuit.
The response to Daniel was overwhelmingly positive, even from the
most unexpected sources. School administrators and other public officials
praised the student plaintiffi as heroes; following an ACLU press confer-
ence, "none other than Inglewood Mayor Roosevelt Dorn proclaim[ed]
[the plaintiffs] local heroes, models of courage."" '3 Similarly, Rhuenette
Montle, acting superintendent of the Inglewood schools and a named
defendant, averred that the plaintiffi' "goals were altruistic as they took
steps to improve the quality of education for students in Inglewood and
in similar districts." '132 One education commentator recognized that this
lawsuit was "designed as a test case to force a change in school practices
throughout California."' 3  "Enlightened school districts," suggested educa-
tion professor Jeannie Oakes, "will welcome the pressure [from the




The parties quickly began to negotiate a settlement that would
remedy the unequal distribution of AP courses and prove the
commitment of the California public schools to their most disadvantaged
students. In August of 1999, plaintiffs consulted with Jeannie Oakes and
requested that she "assemble an independent team of experts to study the
issues concerning inequities in access to Advanced Placement courses and
recommend a remedy that would effectively address those inequities
129. Id. at 29.
130. Id. at 30.
131. Louis Sahagun, Students in Lawsuit Are Cast as Heroes, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1999,
at B2.
132. Mary Reese Boykin, Does Opportunity Knock Equally?, L.A. TMES, Aug. 14,
1999, at A15.
133. Id.
134. Louis Sahagun & Kenneth R_ Weiss, Bias Suit Targets Schools Without Advanced
Classes, L.A. TiMES,July 28, 1999, at Al.
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identified.' ' 3' The UC experts' report 136 identified the reasons for the
unequal access to AP courses in California schools. As summarized in the
plaintiffs' status report, the experts concluded that:
"it is indisputable that having access to a minimum number of
AP classes is a necessary condition for most California students
to gain access to the state's most selective universities"....
[T]hese experts strongly emphasized that although huge dis-
parities in AP offerings existed among California's high
schools, particularly disadvantaging students of color and low
income students, simply requiring a minimum number of AP
courses at each school is not sufficient if other conditions for
success in these courses are not met. The experts concluded
that students attending comprehensive high schools serving
predominantly low-income African American and Latino stu-
dents have substantially less meaningful access to AP offerings
than do students at schools serving predominantly White and
middle [class] populations.
37
In addition to disparities across schools, the experts also examined
unequal access within schools. Numerous California schools with sub-
stantial space constraints have adopted multi-track systems, which were
introduced as a way to accommodate growing school populations.138
Schools are often divided into three tracks, each of which has its own
curricular structure and academic calendar. 39 Though they were not in-
tended to be balkanized by ability grouping, students inevitably became
tracked by assumed ability as school administrations attempted to formu-
late homogeneous student groupings for ease of instruction.14 Depending
upon the student composition of the track, higher-level classes may not
be offered. Therefore, multi-track schools, which are predominantly large
and racially diverse, "create obstacles for African American and Latino stu-
dents to participate in AP course offerings. As a consequence, African
American and Latino students commonly participate in AP classes far less
often than do [W]hite and Asian students within multi-racial campuses''
135. Plaintiffs' Status Report of September 13, 2000 at 7, Daniel v. California (L.A.
Super. Ct. 1999) (No. B C214156) [hereinafter Daniel Status Report].
136. Along with Oakes, the study was written by UC Los Angeles education profes-
sors John Rogers, Patricia McDonough, and Daniel Solorzano; Pedro Noguera of UC
Berkeley; and Hugh Mehan of UC San Diego.
137. Daniel Status Report, supra note 135, at 8 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 9-10.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. For example, in the Los Angeles Unified School District, nineteen of the
forty-nine schools are on a three-track system. David Pierson, The Bad Side of 'B-Tracks'
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To remedy these problems, the experts proposed the creation of a
competitive grant program for California public high schools to stimulate
the growth of AP programs in school districts with deficient college pre-
paratory course offerings."' Through a process of education and advocacy,
the Daniel plaintifl devised an Advanced Placement spot bill entitled
"Advanced Placement Program Equal Opportunity Act," and California
State Senator Martha Escutia submitted a modified form of the spot bill
in the Senate Education Committee on February 15, 2000.143 The gover-
nor of California signed a modified form of that bill into law on July 5,
2000.144
The law establishes an Advanced Placement Challenge Grant pro-
gram, which awards substantial grants to public high schools that attempt
to improve their AP offerings. 145 The grants support the establishment of
infrastructure components-for example, professional development of AP
teachers and counselors, articulation of pathways for students from middle
school through high school, academic support for AP students, and paren-
tal notification of AP availability and the availability of AP exam fee
waivers-in public high schools, giving preference in grant provision to
those schools with the poorest AP programs.'4" Furthermore, to stanch the
effects of tracking on AP availability, the law mandates a minimum
number ofAP courses per in-school track for each funding group."7
The law is notable for its holistic view of the AP program; it accom-
modates grant proposals for numerous "soft" features of curriculum
development and school structure necessary to give students not just formal
but also meaningful access to AP classes.The law includes notification of AP
class offerings, articulated pathways from middle school through high
school for students intent on taking the classes, and summer preparatory
classes."'4
Criticized, L.A. TisEs, Dec. 8,2002, at B1. And, "[o]f the 593 Advanced Placement courses
offered at the district's 19 year-round high schools, 232 are on A-track, 216 are on C-track
and 145 are on B-track." Id. ("School officials said they are often forced to stack high-
achieving and low-achieving courses onto separate calendars at crowded schools because
they don't have the resources to spread them evenly throughout a multi-track system.").
For a general discussion of school tracking and its effects on equality of opportunity
among students, see OAKFS, supra note 127,
142. Daniel Status Report, supra note 135, at 8.
143. See CAL. S.B. 1504, 1999-2000 (Cal. 2000).
144. See CAL. S.B. 1689, 1999-2000 (Cal. 2000).
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 3-5.
147. Id. at 5.
148. See generally CAL. S.B. 1689, 1999-2000 (Cal. 2000). According to Mark
Rosenbaum, an attorney with the ACLU of Southern California who worked on the
Daniel case, parties are still, as of November 19, 2004, in negotiation regarding the final
details of the settlement, and no judgment has yet been entered by the court. Telephone
Interview with Mark Rosenbaum, Legal Director, ACLU of Southern California (Nov. 19,
2004).
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III. CASTANEDA AND DANEL IN CONTEXT
The literature on Castaneda and Daniel is sparse, no doubt in part
because scholars are uncertain how to classify the cases or under which
narrow academic rubric they might fall. The cases defy the conventional
taxonomy of education-based class action civil rights lawsuits. Rather,
they are hybrid cases that fuse the claims of school finance reform and
affirmative action cases by targeting the maldistribution of a particular
educational resource on the grounds that the denial of that resource de-
prives students of the opportunity to compete for admission to
competitive colleges. In doing so, they merge the normative claims of
school equalization litigation with the moral and political imperatives that
drive efforts to diversify higher education. And more importantly, they
capitalize on California's proven political commitment to preserving di-
versity in higher education in the wake of Proposition 209.
This section attempts to situate Castaneda and Daniel in a broad
analytical and theoretical context by discussing the ways in which the
lawsuits challenge the overly wooden and formal notions of educational
equity and adequacy that pervade school finance reform lawsuits, as well
as challenge the rigid contours of the debate about affirmative action and
diversity in higher education. This section also draws on the literature
surrounding school finance reform in Connecticut and New York to
illustrate the non-singularity of the California cases. While the strategies
in these cases were tailored to take advantage of a specific amenable
statutory framework and political atmosphere, Castaneda and Daniel are
instructive for advocates across the United States as they attempt to
fashion creative litigation strategies and judicially enforceable remedies for
the states' educational ills. The lawsuits counsel not only special attention
to the particular contours of state education law and politics but also share
an imagination of how to work within that framework.
A. Defining Educational Equity
The first generation of school finance litigation to arise in the state
courts attempted to equalize school funding across districts. 49 These cases
were premised on the idea that equal funding would engender equal edu-
cational opportunity, a concept known as "equalization" through which
society can "use education to raise the life chances of the least advantaged
(as far as possible) up to those of the most advantaged."'' 0 As the deficiencies
149. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third
Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 ThMP. L. REv. 1151 (1995).
150. AMY GurmANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 131 (1999).
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of an equal funding model became increasingly apparent,"' school finance
litigation markedly shifted towards adequacy claims which sought suffi-
cient educational funding to guarantee all students "functional literacy,"
the "attainment of the skills and knowledge essential for effective func-
tioning in one's society."'52 Contemporary school finance lawsuits almost
invariably involve some mix of equity and adequacy claims and so focus
almost exclusively on reforming the way public education is financed." 3
Though not articulated in this manner, the claims advanced in Cas-
taneda and Daniel represent a detailed version of what school equity might
actually mean. The school finance litigation movement has dominated
public discourse over the equalization of educational opportunity in the
past three decades, and proponents of the movement have cast that equali-
zation in strictly fiscal terms.' 4 But as Professor James E. Ryan explained,
"There is no reason ... why the rights recognized in these [school finance
reform] cases must be defined solely in monetary terms, nor why the
remedy for their violations must be limited to funding."1 5 Rather, because
the right to an equal or adequate education is an affirmative right:
[t]hese rights obligate the state to provide a constitutionally
sufficient education to all students. If courts are going to en-
force such a right, as a significant number of state courts are
currently doing, they necessarily must articulate or embrace
some definition of an equal or adequate education. Up until
now, courts have embraced the plaintiffi' definition of the con-
stitutional right and have generally equated sufficient funding
with a constitutional school system. Providing adequate or
equal funding may be one way for the state to fulfill its af-
firmative duty, but it is surely not the only way."6
Defining the scope of what comprises an equal or adequate education is,
it seems, limited only by a plaintiff's imagination.
To illustrate his conception of the potentialities of school finance re-
form, Professor Ryan turned to Connecticut's most recent school reform
case, Sheff v. O'Neill."7 In Sheff, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that
"the devastating effects that racial and ethnic isolation, as well as poverty
have had on theH education" of the students in the Hartford public
schools constituted a violation of the state constitution's education, equal
151. See Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and the
Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIWES 175 (Helen F Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
152. GUTMANN, supra note 150, at 147.
153. Id. at 128, 139-40.
154. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249,253-54 (1999).
155. Id. at 308.
156. Id.
157. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
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protection, and segregation clauses.""8 The court ordered the state legisla-
ture to fashion a statewide remedy to reduce school segregation and
improve the quality of education in the state's cities." 9 Ryan argued that
"Sheff demonstrates, albeit indirectly, that school finance litigation need
not be solely concerned with the redistribution of resources.' '160 The vast
majority of states adopted, and continue to adopt, financial redistribution
schemes as remedies in these types of lawsuits because such schemes were
the remedies sought by the plaintiffs.16' But, as Pyan explained; courts
have had considerable latitude in devising remedial schemes and, at the
provocation of imaginative plaintiffs, they have felt, and should continue
to feel, free to make educational policy.162 As Pyan noted:
That courts necessarily 'make' educational policy in articulat-
ing constitutionally guaranteed rights is perhaps best illustrated
by several state court decisions holding that students have a
right to an adequate education. The high courts of Kentucky,
West Virginia, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have been
thorough and explicit in defining the content of an adequate
education-listing no fewer than seven detailed aspects of an
adequate education. These courts obviously must have some
notion of what counts as an education in order to explicate ...
aspects of an adequate education---such as sufficient knowl-
edge of one's 'mental health'-are included within the courts'
definition, and others--such as sufficient exposure to those of
different backgrounds and cultures--are excluded.
163
Likewise the demands of the Daniel plaintiffs easily fit within the
broad rubric of potential school equity remedies. The Serrano decisions
established a capacious framework for determining what elements of
schooling must be equalized across districts. Surely in this competitive
economy, access to higher education constitutes "a principal instrument
... in preparing [a student] for later professional training, and in helping
158. Id. at 1270.
159. Id. at 1290.
160. James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
529,541-42 (1999).
161. Id. at 547-48:
Presented with no alternatives, courts striking down school finance systems
have ... equated sufficient funding with a constitutional school system. There
is no reason, however, why the rights need to be defined solely in monetary
terms or remedied solely by increasing funding, especially in light of the
demonstrated inefficacy of increased expenditures.
162. See id. at 554.
163. Id. at 548-49.
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him to adjust normally to his environment"' 6 ' Likewise, "[i]n these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if
he is denied the opportunity" to obtain higher, rather than simply pri-
mary and secondary, education.'65
While it is clear that every high school student in California has
formal access to higher education, such access is meaningless unless it
comprises an equitably distributed opportunity to enroll in each of the
tiers of higher education. It is no great act of state government munifi-
cence to guarantee students admissions into a heavily tracked system of
higher education. As Jeannie Oakes and John Rogers noted," [t]he underly-
ing principle of equal educational opportunity dictates that students
attending any public high school in the state of California should have a
reasonable opportunity to become competitive for admission to any public
institution of higher education in the state." '66 Embracing the Serrano courts'
rubric for limning the contours of educational equity in California, the
Castaneda and Daniel plaintiffs each undertook to change one particular
element of a system riven with inequality. They succeeded because they
tailored their strategy to the favorable political climate in California at the
time.
B. Post-Proposition 209 Politics in California
To civil rights advocates, Proposition 209 portended the death of ra-
cial equality in California and a return to segregated schooling as students
of color were denied access to higher education.'67 But legislative and in-
stitutional action in the years following the proposition's passage suggests
just the opposite.The admissions reforms initiated in the wake of Proposi-
tion 209 and the introduction of numerous education reforms by the state
legislature and institutions of higher education suggested that California
voters and policymakers intended to roll back the racially dilutive effects
of race-blind state practices as quickly as possible.' 8 Indeed, one study of
voter intent in the case of Proposition 209 concluded that:
voter intent surrounding the initiative, when properly ana-
lyzed, expresses the people's desire for a more expansive
interpretation of civil rights protections than advocated by
supporters of the initiative and expressed through current judi-
cial decisions. Specifically, voter intent indicates that voters
164. Serrano 1, 487 P.2d 1241, 1256 (Cal. 1971).
165. Id.
166. JEANNIE OAKES & JOHN ROGERS, THE NEED TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF SB
1689 TO ENSURE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 2 (Aug. 31,
2000) (on file with author).
167. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
168. See Rosen, supra note 7, at 54.
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wanted Proposition 209 to protect against preferences that are
exclusionary and have a racially disparate impact even if they
are not intentionally discriminatory. '69
Castaneda and Daniel were filed in a political climate welcoming to
efforts at reversing the immediate results of Proposition 209's injunction
against race consciousness in university admissions. Both the higher edu-
cation community and the legislature met the students with unmitigated
alacrity. As Charles R. Lawrence III explained, the conventional elite uni-
versity response, "[w]hen confronted with the stark inequalities of our
nation's elementary and secondary education systems," is to "argue that
institutions of higher learning are neither responsible for nor capable of
correcting those inequalities. 1 7 UC Berkeley's response to the challenges
posed by Castaneda and Daniels, however, was just the opposite. Its initia-
tion of a comprehensive admissions overhaul to align its review criteria
with the realities of inequalities in California public high schools betrays a
deep solicitude for the quality of education in the state.
Likewise the legislative response to the lawsuits indicates that the
state was inclined to remedy educational inequalities without judicial in-
tervention. In a letter circulated to California senators and assemblymen,
Daniel plaintiffs' attorney Mark Rosenbaum averred that "legislative re-
solve is the most efficacious answer for California children" in remedying
the inequalities targeted in the lawsuit, and he encouraged legislators to
implement "a comprehensive program which will genuinely ensure that
all students be given an equal opportunity to enroll in challenging college
preparatory courses" 171 The speed with which the Advanced Placement
Challenge Grant program'72 was introduced and the minimal legislative
dissent that accompanied it are evidence of the legislature's willingness to
remedy educational inequality even absent judicial mandate.
A strong contributing factor to this relative ease is that improving
access to higher education is one of the more politically attractive forms
of education reform across the country, especially in a state like California,
which has proven its commitment to providing students with both formal
and meaningful access to higher education. As Los Angeles Times education
columnist Sandy Banks commented, access to college preparatory cur-
riculum is "often regarded as a barometer of our commitment to high
169. Richard Frankel, Note, Proposition 209: A New Civil Rights Revolution?, 18 YALE
L. & PoL'Y REv. 431, 433 (2000).
170. Charles R. Lawrence Il, Two Views of the River:A Critique of the Liberal Defense of
AffirmativeAction, 101 COmUM. L. REv. 928,973 (2001).
171. Letter from Mark Rosenbaum, Legal Director, ACLU of Southern California, to
Sam Aanestad, California Assemblyman (Feb. 21, 2000) (on file with author).
172. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
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expectations." ' In other states where school reform has taken an uncon-
ventional shape, popular support has varied widely, jeopardizing some
school reform programs that embrace controversial or unpopular theories.
For example, resistance to desegregation has hampered efforts to imple-
ment Sheff in Connecticut, and anxieties about the cost and pedagogical
effects of whole-school reform have limited the impact of the Abbott v.
Burke'74 decision in New Jersey."5 California's experience with Castaneda
and Daniel suggests that when school reform efforts are tied to well-
established state prerogatives and preferences, they can have remarkable
success with only minimal judicial intervention.
Clear problems, however, do exist with the California approach.
Appeals to improve AP offerings are fundamentally elitist in that they
attempt to improve education for the highest echelons of a given school
while doing nothing to improve schooling for the lowest-performing
students. Some critics have also expressed concerns about the potential
dilution of the AP program as a greater number of less-prepared students
participate in it.' 6 These reasonable concerns notwithstanding, the
lawsuits successfully undertook to remedy clearly discriminatory policies.
It seems, then, that the political perceptiveness manifested in Castaneda
and Daniel should be replicated elsewhere. The specificity of the
California system should pose no hurdle to imaginative advocates, as each
state's political, educational, and judicial context will give rise to particular
prudent strategies.
New York's current school finance litigation is one promising exam-
ple of such replication. Following the bench trial in Campaign for Fiscal
173. Sandy Banks, AP Courses That Look Good-On Paper, L.A. TImEs, Jun. 25, 2002,
at El.
174. 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985). Abbott was a challenge to New Jersey's school financ-
ing provisions. The litigation has reached the state's highest court five times over nearly
twenty years.
175. See Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey's Experience
Implementing the AbbottV Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 615 (2004); Lauren A.Wetzler,
Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform and Desegregation Came to Compete in Connecti-
cut, 22 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 481 (2004).
176. See Rebecca Trounson & Richard Lee Colvin, Rapid Growth of Advanced Place-
ment Classes Raises Concerns, L.A TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al:
[T]he program's tremendous growth-fueled by government subsidies and
the owner's aggressive promotion-is generating widespread concern among
education experts, admissions officers, counselors, teachers, and even some
students. They fear that some AP classes don't live up to the program's own
high standards or prepare students to enter college with advanced standing.
See also Banks, supra note 173, at El (describing an AP chemistry class in Los Angeles in
which many of the students "read at grade-school level, and couldn't do basic algebra.
Some refused to read outside of class and most of them balked at homework assignments.
And these were high-achieving students at the inner-city school").
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Equity v. New York,' 7 Justice Leland DeGrasse of the New York Supreme
Court issued a ruling outlining the baseline for a "sound basic educa-
tion" ' and ordered the state legislature to fashion a funding scheme to
guarantee at least this basic education to all students. The state education
system, he held, must provide sufficient education to guarantee that all
students have an opportunity to become "engaged, capable voter[s]" and
jurors capable of deciding "complex matters' 1 79 In imposing such a floor
on the quality of education, DeGrasse attempted to legitimate his decision
in the eyes of NewYorkers, whom he presumed to be solicitous about the
functioning of their democratic and legal systems. His intuitions were
confirmed by the public's reaction to the Appellate Division of the State
Supreme Court's reversal of his decision. In that decision, the Appellate
Division held that the education clause mandated only an eighth-grade
education, which, the Court reasoned, would allow all students to "get a
job, and support oneself, and thereby not be a charge on the public fisc"'1
80
New York City officials were appalled at the decision, and newspapers
177. 719 N.YS.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
178. While the education clause of the New York State Constitution provides only
that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free
common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated," N.Y CoNsT. art.
XI, 5 1, the State Court of Appeals interpreted the article to require "a sound basic educa-
tion" in the State's first education finance reform case, Levittown Union Free School Distria
Board of Education v. Nyquist, 453 N.YS.2d 643 (N.Y 1982).
179. 719 N.YS.2d at 485. DeGrasse explained:
Productive citizenship means more than just being qualified to vote or serve
as a juror, but to do so capably and knowledgeably. It connotes civic en-
gagement. An engaged, capable voter needs the intellectual tools to evaluate
complex issues, such as campaign finance reform, tax policy, and global
warming, to name only a few. Ballot propositions in NewYork City, such as
the charter reform proposal that was on the ballot in November 1999, can
require a close reading and a familiarity with the structure of local govern-
ment.
Similarly, a capable and productive citizen doesn't simply show up for jury
service. Rather she is capable of serving impartially on trials that may require
learning unfamiliar facts and concepts and new ways to communicate and
reach decisions with her fellow jurors.To be sure, the jury is in some respects
an anti-elitist institution where life experience and practical intelligence can
be more important than formal education. Nonetheless,jurors may be called
on to decide complex matters that require the verbal, reasoning, math, sci-
ence, and socialization skills that should be imparted in public schools.Jurors
today must determine questions of fact concerning DNA evidence, statistical
analyses, and convoluted financial fraud, to name only three topics.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
180. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. NewYork, 744 N.YS.2d 130, 138 (N.Y App. Div.
2002).
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vitriolically condemned it."' Governor George Pataki's endorsement of
the court's decision became a major issue in his campaign for reelection.'82
When the case finally reached the state's highest court, DeGrasse's reason-
ing was vindicated.The NewYork Court ofAppeals agreed:
[wlith the trial court that students require more than an
eighth-grade education to function productively as citizens,
and that the mandate of the Education Article for a sound ba-
sic education should not be pegged to the eighth or ninth
grade, or indeed to any particular grade level. In CFE [the trial
court decision] we pointed to voting and jury service because
they are the civic responsibilities par excellence. For reasons
founded in the American historical experience, the statutory
requirements for participation in those activities are aimed at
being inclusive.... Yet it cannot reasonably be supposed that
the demands of juror service, and any related demands on the
City schools, have become less rigorous, or that the concept of
a sound basic education would not include literacy.'
3
The New York legislature is currently fashioning a remedy meant to
provide all of the state's public school students with an education that
meets this mandate.8 4 As in the California cases, the dialogue between the
plaintiffi and the court was carried out in a voice that spoke to the people
181. See Michael Cooper, Officials, Minus One, Gather to Assail Court Ruling on Schools,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at B5. The New York Times called the decision a "particularly
troubling piece of reasoning" and urged the court to "take a more expansive view of what
students need to survive in the competitive world." Editorial, Blaming the Victim, N.Y
TIMES,June 26, 2002, at A22. The Times's Bob Herbert called the decision "destructive and
shameful." Bob Herbert, The Bare Minimum, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at A29. Even the
New York Daily News, not known for its sensitivity to the plight of the New York City
public schools, condemned the decision for "deffying] logic."Juan Gonzalez, School Ruling
Defies Logic, N.Y. DAmlY NEws,June 27, 2002, at 24.
182. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Seeking New Momentum, McCall Accuses Pataki of
Patronage Hiring, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 4, 2002, at B8 ("[McCall] said that Mr. Pataki's admini-
stration had shortchanged urban schools in aid for years. He also faulted the governor for
supporting a ruling, by the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court, that the state is
required to provide only an eighth-grade education."); Richard Perez-Pena, Pataki Chal-
lenges McCall on Schools, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, S 1, at 34.
183. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. NewYork, 769 N.YS.2d 106, 111 (N.Y 2003).
184. The perpetually embattled NewYork State Legislature was unable to fashion a
suitable remedy. New York State Supreme Court Justice Leland DeGrasse, who presided
over the Campaign for Fiscal Equity trial, therefore appointed a three-man panel of special
masters to oversee the remedial stage of the case. See Cohn Moynihan, Panel Sets Quick
Pace for Deciding School Aid, N.Y TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2004, at B3. On November 30, 2004, the
masters submitted their final report and recommendations to Justice DeGrasse, who is
expected to rule on them some time in early 2005. See Greg Winter, City Schools Need
$5.6 Billon More, Court Panel Says, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at Al. He had not ruled on
them as ofJanuary 12, 2005.
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of New York. It is impossible to know whether their strong reaction
against the Appellate Division's cold, economic calculus and in favor of
the Supreme Court's and Court of Appeals' invocation of fundamental
democratic principles was more than indignant posturing. Regardless, the
provision of an education in the service of democracy stood as the man-
date with which the state legislature continues to grapple.
At a more theoretical level, the California lawsuits also serve a
strongly anti-elitist purpose that is deployable at numerous levels of edu-
cational inequality. As Charles Lawrence explained, in contradistinction to
cases like Gratz v. Bollinge 85 and Grutter v. Bollinger,M which foreground
elite institutions' claim of a right to maintain a diverse student body, the
Daniel lawsuit "made subordinated minority children the plaintiffs in the
case, placing the victims of racism at the center of the issue."1 7 "Grounded
in antisubordination theory'""" the lawsuit attacked:
the discriminatory impact of the so-called 'color-blind,' 'merit-
based' system [and] exposes and demands an end to systemic,
institutional racial preferences.... The case's caption reflects
the reality of racism and gives voice to those who are really on
the bottom. There is more than symbolism in this transposition
of roles. There is a difference in the substantive claim, a differ-
ent view of what constitutes equality, a different remedy
requested, and, ultimately, a different conception ofjustice.189
The antisubordination perspective breathes new life into advocacy
on behalf of underprivileged students. By probing the specific nature and
deficiencies of these students' educations, advocates who embrace this
antisubordination theory are forced to root out myriad practices that are
facially neutral but that implicitly derogate the capacities of certain stu-
dents by further entrenching the deficiencies of their education rather
than liberating them from such disadvantages.
CONCLUSION
Conversations about educational equity are notoriously path-
dependent. Conceptions of what constitutes equal educational opportunity
rest on age-old aphorisms and milquetoast assertions about "What Students
Need" The strategies and policies that emerge from these conversations are
simplistically rehashed versions of long-abandoned practices and they offer
185. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
186. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
187. Lawrence, supra note 170, at 946.
188. Id. at 949.
189. Id. at 946-47.
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little new to the debate. An emerging generation of students and their
advocates, frustrated with the status quo and ambitious in imagining what
public education might look like in coming decades, has begun to worry
about using stale definitions of educational equity and meaningful access
to educational provision. Castaneda and Daniel represent prime examples
of this new generation's handiwork. Indeed, many of the same lawyers
who worked on Castaneda and Daniel recently settled another education
equity lawsuit, Williams v. California, which will provide students in the
state's poorest schools with, among other things, adequate facilities and
school supplies. '90
The legislative and popular responses to the two California lawsuits
suggest that the public has not abandoned public education. Rather, the
response suggests that voters, politicians, and educational bureaucrats are
interested in new and provocative ways of improving the system for ambi-
tious students. Piecemeal approaches to education reform might not be
the best route, but absent an overwhelming national commitment to ame-
liorating public education along with the ambient social circumstances to
which educational inequality has long been attributed, they might be the
wisest tack for education reformers to take.
Castaneda and Daniel arose from a statutory framework, educational
context, and singular policy and political environment that were particularly
amenable to the plaintiffs' claims and their proposed remedies. While such
remedies and claims might not readily translate across state borders, each
state's own constitutional, educational, and political context, under sufficient
scrutiny by sensitive and welcoming eyes, will reveal the particular educa-
tional deficiencies most likely to generate the political will necessary to
eventuate in their remediation, as evidenced by the experiences of Con-
necticut and New York. Defining educational equity has been a task for
individual states for the last thirty years, ever since San Antonio v. Rodriguez
abrogated any national constitutional responsibility for the quality of public
education in America. '91 Within this devolutionary framework of flexibility
and experimentation, nearly anything is possible. Castaneda and Daniel
challenge all advocates for educational equity to think big, unfettered by
the outdated policies and ideas that have long hampered the boldest ideas
for education reform.
190. See Press Release, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU and State of California
Reach Settlement In Historic Williams Education lawsuit (Aug. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.aclu-sc.org/News/Releases/i00740/; see also Notice of Proposed Settlement,
Williams v. State of California, No. 312336 (S.E Super. Ct. filed May 17, 2000) (on file
with author).
191. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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